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Abstract
We study the properties of finitely complex, symmetric, globally
stable, and semi-perfect equilibria. We show that: (1) If a strategy
satisfies these properties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game in every period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game
equals the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3)
A strategy vector satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if
and only if players play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the
stage game in every stage.
Our second main result is a strong anti-Folk Theorem, since, in
contrast to what is described by the Folk Theorem, the set of equilib-
rium payoffs does not expand when the game is repeated.
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1 Introduction
The framework of repeated games allows us to understand many familiar
social interactions. In particular, as Aumann (1981) pointed out, it can “ac-
count for phenomena such as cooperation, altruism, revenge, [and] threats”
that would be difficult to rationalize if individuals were to interact just once.
Partly, the importance of these phenomena is that they make efficient
outcomes become self-enforcing. This is clearly illustrated by the prisoner’s
dilemma: if this game is played infinitely many times (and players are suf-
ficiently patient), then the cooperative outcome is sustained as a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome by the threat of punishing any player that fails
to play cooperatively.
Unfortunately, repeating a game also allows for inefficient outcomes to
arise as equilibrium outcomes. In fact, the Folk Theorem (see Aumann
(1981), Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), and Rubinstein (1979)) shows, under
mild conditions, that each individually rational payoff is a subgame perfect
equilibrium payoff, provided that the discount factor is sufficiently close to
one. Thus, the set of equilibrium payoffs is typically very large, making it
hard to predict an actual equilibrium outcome for a given social interaction
being analyzed. This creates a serious problem in applying repeated games
to real-world problems. In fact, as Aumann (1981) notes, “[i]n a sense, much
of the theory of repeated games is an attempt to cut down, in one way or
another, the bewildering wealth of equilibrium payoffs provided by [the Folk
Theorem].”
We show that, by combining several notions used to study repeated
games, the set of equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game becomes equal
to the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the stage game. This results in a
strong anti-Folk Theorem, since, in contrast to what is described by the Folk
Theorem, the set of equilibrium payoffs does not expand when the game is
repeated.
The notions that we use to define our equilibrium concept are finite com-
plexity, symmetry, global stability and semi-perfection. They were intro-
duced independently by several authors to reflect the view that repeated
games strategies represent social institutions, and that these are properties
that social institutions typically have, which, in fact, may be necessary for
any social institution to endure.
Aumann (1981, p. 21) proposed the use of finite automata in order to
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define a simple class of repeated game strategies.1 A finite automaton strat-
egy encodes the set of all possible histories into a finite set of states, which
completely describes players’ behavior. Therefore, finite automata strategies
are simpler than a general repeated game strategy because these require, in
general, an infinite set of states (equal to the countable infinite set of all
possible histories) to encode players’ behavior.
When players use strategies that can be represented by finite automata,
it is natural to define the complexity of a strategy by the size (i.e., the num-
ber of states) of the smallest automaton that implements it (see Kalai and
Stanford (1988, Theorem 3.1, p. 401).)2 To the extent that more complex
strategies are more costly to play, players’ preferences should depend both
on repeated game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. One
equilibrium concept defined in terms of such preferences is semi-perfection
(see Rubinstein (1986, p. 90)). This concept requires not only that each
player’s strategy maximizes her preferences given the other players’ strate-
gies, but also that it remains optimal at all stages of the game.
Symmetry is a property that is often assumed to capture the notion of a
common culture or a common legal system. We will call a strategy symmetric
if all players share a common state space, a common initial state and a
common transition function, properties which were assumed in the notion of
social norms used by Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995).
One stability property that has been advocated is that mistakes that
players might make in the beginning of the game should not have a long-
term effect on players’ payoffs — this property was named global stability
by Kandori (1992, p. 73).3 This property captures a form of forgiveness: if
a player fails to choose as dictated by the strategy, one can expect that he
will be punished, resulting in a loss in his payoff. However, if the strategy is
globally stable, this loss of payoffs is essentially temporary, since eventually
his payoff will virtually return to the initial level.
We study the structure of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable,
1Finite automata were introduced by McCulloch and Pitts (1943); see also Hopcroft
and Ullman (1979). That social institutions should be simple, and represented by finite
automata was defended, or at least assumed, by Kandori (1992, p. 72), Okuno-Fujiwara
and Postlewaite (1995, p. 83), Rubinstein (1986, p. 84), and Schotter (1981, p. 57).
2Alternative definitions of the complexity of a strategy are proposed in Banks and
Sundaram (1990), and in Lipman and Srivastava (1990).
3Some other stability properties that are close in spirit to global stability were proposed
by Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995, p. 100).
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semi-perfect equilibria. Our main results are:
1. A strategy vector is a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-
perfect equilibrium only if players play payoff-equivalent Nash equilib-
ria of the stage game in every period.
2. The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect
equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equi-
libria payoffs in the stage game, and
3. A strategy vector is a Pareto optimal, finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium if and only if players play some
Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage.
The first and third results (partially) characterize equilibrium strategies.
In both cases, properties of repeated game strategies are directly related to
corresponding properties of stage game strategies. While it is clear that re-
peating a stage game Nash equilibrium forever is a finitely complex, symmet-
ric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium, our first main result shows that
this is essentially the only possible case. The possible exception arises when
players alternate between different, but payoff-equivalent Nash equilibria of
the stage game. In any case, the payoff of such a strategy in the repeated
game is the payoff of a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, establishing our
second main result.
Furthermore, a strategy in which players alternate between several payoff-
equivalent Nash equilibria of the stage game is more complex than one con-
sisting of repeating one such Nash equilibrium, and, clearly, it yields the
same payoff to all players. Thus, all players can be better off by playing
only one of those Nash equilibria. In other words, the Pareto optimal way of
obtaining the properties of finite complexity, symmetry, global stability and
semi-perfection requires that players repeat a Pareto optimal Nash equilib-
rium in every period.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our notation
and basic definitions. In Section 3, we present our main results. We then
discuss several possible interpretations of our results in Section 4. In partic-
ular, we discuss how they can provide a rationale for Markovian behavior, an
interpretation of Nash equilibria and a framework to address the optimality
of social institutions. In Appendix A.1, we establish a converse for our first
main result. In Appendix A.2, we study the robustness of our results by
considering similar, but different equilibrium concepts.
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2 Notation and Definitions
Our notation follows closely the one used by Kalai and Stanford (1988). A
normal form game G is defined by
G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, (1)
where: (1) N is the set of players, (2) Ai is the set of player i’s actions,
and (3) for all i ∈ N , ui : A → R, where A =
∏
i∈N Ai, is player i’s payoff
function. We assume that N is a finite set, and that N = {1, . . . , n}. The
set Ai, i ∈ N , may or may not be finite.
The supergame of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G
taking place in periods t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . At period t the players make simulta-
neous moves denoted by ati ∈ Ai and then each player learns his opponent’s
move.
Finally we need to specify the strategies that players can use and also a
way to evaluate payoff in the supergame ofG. For all k ≥ 1, a k−stage history
is a k−length sequence hk = (a1, . . . , ak), where, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, at ∈ A;
the space of all k−stage histories is Hk, i.e., Hk = Ak (the k−fold Cartesian
product of A.) The notation e stands for the unique 0–stage history — it is
a 0–length history that represents the beginning of the supergame. The set
of all histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
n=0Hn.
For all h ∈ H, define hr ∈ A to be the projection of h onto its rth
coordinate. For all h ∈ H, we let `(h) denote the length of h. For any
two positive length histories h and h¯ in H we define the concatenation of
h and h¯, in that order, to be the history (h · h¯) of length `(h) + `(h¯): (h ·
h¯) = (h1, h2, . . . , h`(h), h¯1, h¯2, . . . , h¯`(h¯)). We also make the convention that
e · h = h · e = h for all h ∈ H.
For all i ∈ N , a strategy for player i is a function fi : H → Ai mapping
histories into actions. The set of player i’s strategies is denoted by Σi, and
Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi is the joint strategy space. Finally, a strategy vector is f =
(f1, . . . , fn).
Any strategy f ∈ F induces a history h(f) as follows:
h1(f) = f(e), hk(f) = f(h1(f), . . . , hk−1(f)), (2)
for all k ∈ N.
The payoff in the supergame of G is, for some δ ∈ (0, 1), the discounted
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sum of stage game payoffs:
U i(f) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δk−1ui(hk(f)). (3)
Given an individual strategy fi ∈ Σi and a history h ∈ H, we denote
the individual strategy induced by fi at h by fi|h. This strategy is defined
pointwise on H: (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯), for all h¯ ∈ H. We will use (f |h) to
denote (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for all f ∈ Σ and h ∈ H. We let Σi(fi) = {fi|h : h ∈
H} and Σ(f) = {f |h : h ∈ H}.
2.1 Automata and Symmetry
For all i ∈ N, let fi be a strategy for player i. We define an equivalence
relation on H, by declaring the histories h and h¯ equivalent relative to fi,
h ∼fi h¯, if for all histories β ∈ H, fi(h · β) = fi(h¯ · β). In words, the
behavior prescribed by fi after h is the same as the behavior prescribed by
fi after h¯. Let H/ ∼fi denote the quotient set of H relative to ∼fi . Then
the complexity of fi, denoted by comp(fi), is defined to be the cardinality
of H/ ∼fi(see Kalai (1990, Theorem 4.2, p. 144).) Let Fi denote the set of
player i’s strategies with finite complexity, and let F =
∏
i∈N Fi. Also, let
[h]fi denote the equivalence class of h ∈ H; when it is clear which equivalence
relation we are referring to, we write [h] for [h]fi .
An automaton for player i is a triple Ii = ((Si, s
0
i ), Ti, Bi) where: Si is a
set of states ; s0i is an initial state; Ti : Si × A → Si is a transition function;
and Bi : Si → Ai is a behavior function. Any automaton Ii for player i
induces a strategy fIi as follows: for all histories h ∈ H with `(h) = m define
inductively
s0i (h) = s
0
i , s
r
i (h) = Ti(s
r−1
i (h), h
r) for all r = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (4)
and then fIi(h) = Bi(s
m
i (h)).
Given a strategy fi ∈ Fi for player i, we say that the automaton Ii
implements fi if fi = fIi . For all fi ∈ Fi we see that Ifi defined by Sfi =
H/ ∼fi , s0fi = [e], Tfi([h], a) = [h · a] and Bfi([h]) = fi(h), implements fi.
Moreover, Ifi is minimal in the sense that if Ii also implements fi then the
cardinality of Sfi is less than or equal to the cardinality of Si (see Kalai (1990,
Theorem 4.2, p. 144), and also Kalai and Stanford (1988, Theorem 3.1, p.
401).) Given this result, we will regard any strategy as an automaton.
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The following notation will be useful: Given a strategy f ∈ Σ and
a state s ∈ S = ∏i∈N Si we denote the strategy induced by f at s by
f |s = (fi|si)i∈N . The strategy fi|si is defined as follows: for all i ∈ N , if
fi = ((Si, s
0
i ), Ti, Bi), then fi|si is defined as the minimal automaton that im-
plements ((Si, si), Ti, Bi). Clearly, comp(fi|si) ≤ comp(fi) and it may be that
comp(fi|si) < comp(fi), as the following example illustrates. Let a¯i, a˜i ∈ Ai,
a¯i 6= a˜i and fi be defined by Si = {α, β}, s0i = α, Ti(α, a) = Ti(β, a) = β for
all a ∈ A, Bi(α) = a¯i and Bi(β) = a˜i. Then, fi|β = (({β}, β), Ti|{β}×A, Bi|{β})
and so comp(fi|β) = 1 < 2 = comp(fi).
We will say that a strategy is symmetric if players condition their play on
a common state variable, and this common state variable evolves according
to a common transition function.
Definition 1 A strategy vector f is symmetric if for all i, j ∈ N , Si = Sj,
s0i = s
0
j , and Ti = Tj.
We interpret symmetry as a common culture, or a common legal system.
For an example, consider two players who play (a version of) tit-for-tat in a
prisoners’ dilemma situation. In this case, they all have the same state space
({cooperative, non− cooperative}), the same initial state (cooperative) and
the same transition function (cooperative follows cooperative if both players
play cooperatively, while non-cooperative follows otherwise; and cooperative
follows non-cooperative if at least one player plays cooperatively, while non-
cooperative follows otherwise). There are many real-world examples that fit
this description, for example, an arms race between two countries.
Note that we do not impose that players have the same behavior function
in a symmetric strategy. In the above example, some players may choose
diverse levels of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. In the arms race
example, a country can respond to an increase in the opponent country’s
arsenal by also increasing its own arsenal or, alternatively, by invading the
other country. In fact, in our notion of symmetry there is no symmetry
requirement on the game – players may have different action sets and payoff
functions.
2.2 Stability
In this section, we give the stability definition for repeated game strategies
that we will use. It is based on the notion of global stability introduced by
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Kandori (1992); in fact, it is simply his notion applied to our setting.4
Definition 2 Let f ∈ Σ and let (u¯i)i∈N = (U i(f))i∈N . Then f is globally
stable if for all i ∈ N , and s ∈ S,
lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s) = u¯i, (5)
where U ik(f |s) = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=k δ
t−kui((f |s)t) is player i’s continuation payoff
at stage k.
Note that in the definition of global stability the state s is any possible
state, not necessarily the one implied by the play of the equilibrium strategy.
The requirement of global stability is that no matter what the past has been,
future play of the equilibrium strategies will asymptotically give players the
same payoff as if the equilibrium strategies were always followed. Kandori
introduced this concept in the context of his work on social norms to cap-
ture the intuition that social norms are generally “robust to the mistakes of
players” and that they allow “players to test various actions in order to learn
[them]”.
2.3 Complexity
As Rubinstein (1998, p. 137) writes,
[a]t the heart of our discussion in this [section] is the trade-
off often facing a decision maker when choosing a strategy. On
one hand, he hopes his strategy will serve his goals; on the other
hand, he would like it to be as simple as possible. There are many
reasons why a player may value simplicity: a more complex plan
of action is more likely to break down, is more difficult to learn
and may require more time to be implemented. We will not
examine these reasons here but simply assume that complexity is
costly and under the control of the player.
4As an anonymous referee pointed out, it might be more reasonable to also impose
a restriction on the long-term complexity the strategy. Such a stronger notion of global
stability and its implications are developed in Appendix A.2. However, note that all our
main results will also hold for that notion simply because it is a stronger concept (see
Theorem 5 in Appendix A.2).
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We assume as in Abreu and Rubinstein (1988, p. 1264) that players’
preferences depend both on repeated game payoffs and the complexity of the
strategies they use. For all players i ∈ N , let ºi be player i’s preference
relation on R× N. We assume that ºi
1. is increasing in the payoff:
a > b and α = β implies (a, α) Âi (b, β). (6)
2. is decreasing in complexity:
a = b and α > β implies (a, α) ≺i (b, β). (7)
An equilibrium concept defined using the above preference relation is:
Definition 3 (Rubinstein (1986)) A strategy vector f ∈ F is a semi-
perfect equilibrium if for all i ∈ N , s ∈ S and f¯i ∈ Fi with initial state
s¯0i ,
(U i(f |s), comp(fi)) ºi (U i((f¯i, f−i)|(s¯0i , s−i)), comp(f¯i)). (8)
A particular case, considered in Rubinstein (1986), arises when players
have lexicographic preferences over payoffs and complexity. This preference
relation, denoted by ºL is defined as follows: for all (a, α), (b, β) in R × N,
(a, α) ÂL (b, β) if and only if a > b or a = b and α > β. It is then clear
that if players have lexicographic preference, any semi-perfect equilibrium is
a subgame perfect equilibrium. This result is not true for general preferences
in games with more than two players. However, for two-player games with
preferences satisfying properties 1 and 2 above, it is true that any semi-perfect
equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium (see Piccione (1992, Theorem
2, p. 187)).
3 Structure of Equilibria
In this section, we state and prove our main results, concerning the structure
of equilibria. They provide a characterization of the (finitely complex, sym-
metric, globally stable, semi-perfect) equilibrium payoffs, and of the Pareto
optimal equilibria. In addition, they provide necessary conditions on the
form of equilibrium strategies.
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For all f ∈ F , let s(f) = {s(f)k}∞k=0 be the sequence of states induced by
the play of f and S(f) = {s ∈ S : there exists k ∈ N0 such that s(f)k = s}
be the set of states used by f . If, in addition, f is symmetric, let D = {s ∈
S : si = sj for all i, j ∈ N} be the set of diagonal elements of S. Clearly,
S(f) ⊆ D.
Lemma 1 below states that for all finitely complex, symmetric, semi-
perfect equilibria, all diagonal states will be used in equilibrium, and any
diagonal state can be reached starting from any other diagonal state.
Lemma 1 Let f ∈ F be a finitely complex, symmetric, semi-perfect equilib-
rium. Then, for all s, s¯ ∈ D, there exists {sk}Kk=1 ⊆ D such that s1 = s,
sK = s¯ and sk = T (sk−1, B(sk−1)) for all k = 2, . . . , K.
Proof. Let s, s¯ ∈ D and i ∈ N . We claim that if s¯i can be reached from
s, then s¯ can be reached from s. Indeed, if s¯i can be reached from s, then
there exists {sk}Kk=1 such that s1 = s, sKi = s¯i and sk = T (sk−1, B(sk−1)) for
all k = 2, . . . , K. Since f is symmetric, then sk ∈ D for all k = 1, . . . , K. In
particular, sK = s¯.
Thus, if s¯ ∈ D could not be reached from s ∈ D, then there is a player i ∈
N such that s¯i cannot be reached from s. Thus, player i would deviate from
f at state s: he could remove the state s¯i, therefore reducing the complexity
and still obtain the same payoff.
Lemma 1 implies that we can orderD, and thus writeD = {s0, s1, . . . , sL},
with L = |D| − 1, in such a way that sk = T (sk−1, B(sk−1)), for all k =
1, . . . , L, and s0 = T (sL, B(sL)). In words, the play of the game will induce
a cycle on the set of diagonal states starting from the first period. Thus,
S(f) = D.
Since the states that are used in the play of the game will cycle, so will the
continuation payoffs for any given player. However, global stability requires
that continuation payoffs converge, which is possible only if they are all equal.
This is the content of the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let f ∈ F be a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-
perfect equilibrium, and let (u¯i)i∈N = (U i(f))i∈N .
Then for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S(f),
U i(f |s) = u¯i. (9)
Furthermore, ui(B(s)) = u¯i.
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Proof. Let i ∈ N and s ∈ S(f). Since D = {s0, s1, . . . , sL}, with
L = |D| − 1, then s = sn for some 0 ≤ n ≤ L. We have then, for all k ∈ N,
U ik(f |s) =

U i(f |sn) if k = 1, L+ 1, 2L+ 1, . . .
U i(f |sn+1 mod L) if k = 2, L+ 2, 2L+ 2, . . .
...
U i(f |sn+L mod L) if k = L, 2L, 3L, . . . .
(10)
Since by assumption lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s) = u¯i, it follows that U i(f |sl) = u¯i, for
all 0 ≤ l ≤ L. In particular, U i(f |s) = U i(f |sn) = u¯i.
Finally, since U i(f |s) = (1−δ)ui(B(s))+δu¯i it follows that ui(B(s)) = u¯i.
As a consequence, we have Theorem 1, which yields a necessary condition
on equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 1 If a strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium, then B(s) is a Nash equilibrium of
G, for all s ∈ S(f).
Proof. Let s ∈ S(f) and i ∈ N . We will show that Bi(s) is a static best
reply to B−i(s), which will establish the theorem.
Assume that Bi(s) is not a best reply to B−i(s). Let a∗ be a best reply
in G against B−i(s). In particular, ui(a∗, B−i(s)) > ui(B(s)) = u¯i. Define f¯i
as follows: S¯i = Si, s¯
0
i = si, T¯i = Ti and
B¯i(s¯i) =
{
a∗ if s¯ = s
Bi(s¯i) otherwise.
(11)
It follows immediately that comp(f¯i) ≤ comp(fi). We claim that
Ui((f¯i, f−i)|s) > Ui(f |s).
Let s′ = T (s, (a∗, B−i(s)). Since S¯i = Si, s¯0i = si and T¯i = Ti, it fol-
lows that S(f¯i, f−i|s′) ⊆ D = S(f). Thus, player i will receive a payoff
of ui(a
∗, B−i(s)) > u¯i whenever state s is reached after s′ and a payoff of
ui(B(s˜)) = u¯i if state s˜ 6= s is reached. Hence, Ui((f˜i, f−i)|s′) ≥ u¯i (note
that it might happen that state s is not reached starting from state s′ under
(f¯i, f−i)). Therefore, it follows that
Ui((f˜i, f−i)|s) = (1−δ)ui(a∗, B−i(s))+δUi((f˜i, f−i)|s′) > u¯i = Ui(f |s). (12)
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This inequality contradicts the fact that f is a semi-perfect equilibrium.
Hence, it must be that Bi(s) is a best reply to B−i(s) for all i ∈ N , and so,
B(s) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 place a strong restriction on the outcomes and
payoffs that can arise in equilibrium. They imply that in every stage of
a game in which players play in the way described in Theorem 1 we will
observe a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. This result yields the following
interpretation of Nash equilibria: In a given society, simple, symmetric, stable
and minimally complex behavior is described by Nash equilibria.
Let N(G) be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the stage game G,
and let E(G) be the set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-
perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game. As an immediate conse-
quence of Theorem 1, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2 A payoff vector u = (ui)i∈N is a finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoff in the repeated game if and
only if u is a Nash equilibrium payoff in the stage game.
Proof. In symbols, Theorem 2 states that E(G) = N(G). Note first that
the strategy of repeating a Nash equilibrium of G forever is a finitely complex,
symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium. Thus, N(G) ⊆ E(G).
Conversely, if follows by Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 that if f is a finitely
complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium, then B(s) is
a Nash equilibrium of G and ui(B(s)) = u¯i for all s ∈ S(f) and all i ∈ N .
Thus, u = (Ui(f))i∈N = (u¯i)i∈N ∈ N(G).
Theorem 2 reinforces the association expressed in Theorem 1 between the
Nash equilibrium of a given stage game, and the simple, symmetric, stable,
and minimally complex equilibria of its supergame: This association is exact
for the payoff that players receive in equilibrium.
Note that the association between Nash equilibrium outcomes of a given
stage game and the simple, symmetric, stable, and minimally complex equi-
librium outcomes of its supergame is not exact. In fact, we may have an
equilibrium outcome in the supergame consisting of oscillations between sev-
eral different (but payoff equivalent) Nash equilibria.
Consider the following example of a coordination game. Let n = 2 and
Ai = {αi, βi}, i = 1, 2. Preferences are lexicographic for both players. Let
payoffs be given by Table 1.
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1\2 α2 β2
α1 1, 1 0, 0
β1 0, 0 1, 1
Table 1: Payoff Function for the Example
Consider the following strategy: S = {s0, s1}, T (s0, a) = s1, T (s1, a) = s0
for all a, and B(s0) = (α1, α2), B(s
1) = (β1, β2). This strategy is clearly
finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, and semi-perfect.
However, one may argue that the above equilibrium outcome is unlikely:
players would eventually agree to meet in just one location, because they
would reduce the complexity of their behavior, while maintaining their pay-
off. In other words, that strategy is Pareto dominated by another strategy
satisfying all the properties we are interested with. In general, we say a
strategy σ in a given game is a Pareto optimal equilibrium if it is Pareto
optimal within the set of all equilibria (i.e., if it cannot be Pareto dominated
by any other equilibrium). This definition applies to both the game G and
the supergame of G, and for all equilibrium concepts we may wish to use.
Our next result characterizes the set of Pareto optimal, finitely complex,
symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibria: They consist of repeti-
tions of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game. In this way,
we obtain an exact association between Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium out-
comes of a given game, and the Pareto optimal finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium outcomes of its supergame.
Theorem 3 A strategy f is a Pareto optimal, finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium if and only if comp(fi) = 1 for all
i ∈ N and B(s0) is a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. We start by establishing the if part. The strategy consisting
of repeating a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of G forever is a finitely
complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium. Since N(G) =
E(G), then this strategy is also a Pareto optimal equilibrium in the repeated
game.
Finally, we turn to the only if part. Let f be a Pareto optimal, finitely
complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium. By Theorem
1 and Lemma 2, B(s) is a Nash equilibrium of G and ui(B(s)) = u¯i for all
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s ∈ S. Since the vector of payoffs (u¯1, . . . , u¯n) can be obtained by playing
B(s0) forever, it follows that comp(fi) = 1 (i.e., if comp(fi) > 1, then the
strategy consisting of repeating Bi(s
0) forever would Pareto dominate f in
the repeated game). This, in turn, implies that B(s0) is a Pareto optimal
equilibrium of G (since, otherwise, repeating a Pareto optimal Nash equilib-
rium of G would Pareto dominate f in the repeated game).
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss our main results by providing alternative interpre-
tations for them.
4.1 Rationalizing Markovian Behavior
We can interpret our main results as stating that static Nash equilibrium is
a reasonable concept to describe repeated strategic interactions.
The idea that static Nash equilibria are reasonable descriptions of re-
peated strategic interactions is also present in the work of Green (1980),
Sabourian (1990), and Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001). These authors
study repeated interactions in large societies, in which any player’s payoffs
depend on his choice, and an aggregate outcome. Under different assump-
tions, they show that in any subgame perfect equilibrium most players play
static ε−best replies in every period, i.e., an approximate version of our The-
orem 1 holds in their framework. Our results differ from these in two ways:
first, although expressing similar ideas, the framework they consider differs
considerably from ours; and second, we obtain that, under the assumptions
of Theorem 1, exact Nash equilibria will be played.5
As pointed out by Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001), we may interpret
our results as providing a justification of Markovian behavior. In our frame-
work there is no exogenous state variable, and so in any (time-independent)
Markovian strategy players play the same action profile in every period.
Thus, Theorem 3 justifies Markovian strategies as a Pareto optimal way of
obtaining finite complexity, symmetry, global stability, and semi-perfection.6
5For an alternative interpretation of Nash equilibrium using large (i.e., non-atomic),
but static, games see Barlo and Carmona (2002).
6A similar approach is taken in Carmona (2002a, Chapter 4), where monetary trading
is rationalized as a Pareto efficient way to obtain the same properties. See also Carmona
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Markovian strategies are more appealing when there is an exogenous state
variable, i.e., in the stochastic case. Hence, it would be interesting to have an
analogue of Theorem 3 for stochastic games. If we allow the initial state of
any automata to be randomly determined, then the main result of Carmona
(2002a, chapter 4) shows that an analogue of Theorem 3 does not hold —
in general, non-Markovian strategies may be needed to obtain the above
properties in a Pareto optimal way. However, if the initial state of each
automaton is set deterministically (as is the case in the present paper), we
conjecture that an analogue of Theorem 3 will hold, at least for a large class
of games.
4.2 Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium
In his Ph.D. dissertation, John Nash proposed two interpretations of his
equilibrium concept, with the objective of showing how equilibrium points
“(...) can be connected with observable phenomenon.” (Nash (1950, p. 21))
One interpretation is rationalistic: if we assume that players are rational,
they know the full structure of the game, the game is played just once, and
there is just one Nash equilibrium, then players will play according to that
equilibrium.
This interpretation was discussed formally by Aumann and Branden-
burger (1995), where they identify sufficient epistemic conditions for a Nash
equilibrium to be played. One of their conditions is that the conjecture
players make about the strategy of the others is commonly known.7 This
assumption has been criticized by Jacobsen (1996) on the grounds that it is
not plausible to assume that one player knows what another player thinks.
If we interpret repeated game strategies as social institutions, then any con-
jecture a player might form about other players can be interpreted as being
part of the particular social institution shaping players’ interaction. This in-
terpretation renders Aumann and Brandenburger’s epistemic condition quite
reasonable.
A second interpretation of Nash equilibrium, which Nash names mass-
action interpretation, is less demanding on the players. In this interpretation,
“[i]t is unnecessary to assume that the participants have full knowledge of the
(2002b), in which the same result is established under weaker restrictions in a similar
model.
7See Aumann and Brandenburger (1995, Theorem B). If there are only two players,
then players’ conjectures need only to be mutually known, as their Theorem A shows.
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total structure of the game, or the ability and inclination to go through any
complex reasoning processes.” (Nash (1950, p. 21)) What is assumed is that
there is a population of participants for each position in the game, which will
be played throughout time by participants drawn at random from the differ-
ent populations. If there is a stable average frequency with which each pure
strategy is employed by the “average member” of the appropriate population,
then this stable average frequency constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
The framework developed by Nash (1950) for the mass-action interpre-
tation is also appealing as a description of individuals’ interaction in large
societies. In particular, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), and Kan-
dori (1992) have used a similar framework to stress the importance of social
institutions in individual decision-making: in environments in which indi-
viduals interact throughout time, and have limited information about the
others, social institutions can be helpful in summarizing the past, and form-
ing expectations about the behavior of other players.
If we interpret finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect
strategies as enduring social institutions, then we can argue that in those
social institutions that are likely to endure, players play a Nash equilibrium
in every period. This provides a social institution interpretation of Nash
equilibrium.
4.3 On Social Institutions
In this paper, we define social institutions as strategies in some repeated
game. Although there may not be complete agreement on the notion of
social institutions, several authors have described them in this fashion. For
example, Schotter (1981, p. 24) argues that “(...) social institutions can
be best described as noncooperative equilibria of supergames that involve
repeated play of some particular constituent game (...).”
Viewing social institutions as supergame strategies, several authors have
argued that equilibria in such games should satisfy certain additional prop-
erties. These additional properties should be imposed not only because they
are regarded as desirable from a normative point of view, but also, because
they are viewed as properties that social institutions typically have, and
which may be necessary for any social institution to endure. In fact, all the
properties that we have used have been motivated, at least partly, with such
concerns.
If one accepts the view that an equilibrium social institution is, by defin-
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ition, a finite complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium,
then Theorem 1 describes its structure. Furthermore, with this interpreta-
tion in mind, we can also use Theorem 3 to describe the Pareto optimal social
institutions in societies that can be appropriately described by a discounted
repeated game.
Unfortunately, when applied to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, the
above results imply that there is a unique finitely complex, symmetric, glob-
ally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium players play ‘defect’
in every period, and so any form of ‘cooperative behavior’ is impossible to
obtain in a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable and semi-perfect way.
Thus, in social interactions that have a prisoners’-dilemma-like structure,
any social institution will produce an inefficient outcome. However, this is
in contrast with the view that social institutions (or, at least, those that are
optimal) are essentially a way to allow players to obtain a better outcome.
There are at least two ways to address this issue. One way is to add that
the properties that we have highlighted only describe decentralized social
institutions. With this view, our results would serve as a rationale for gov-
ernment intervention in social interactions with inefficient Nash equilibria,
and also to point out that a key issue in such intervention is to make credible
the threat of punishments that will not be used in equilibrium.
Alternatively, we can simply take from our results that although each
condition that we use seems reasonable by itself, they lead to an implausi-
ble conclusion when we combine them.8 In this view, we would no longer
associate social institutions to finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable,
semi-perfect equilibria. Both cases, but especially this one, show that, al-
though repeated games seems to be the natural framework to study social
institutions, we still need a good notion of an equilibrium social institution
and of an optimal social institution.
A Appendix
A.1 On the Converse of Theorem 1
The following example shows that the condition in Theorem 1 is not sufficient
for a strategy to be a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-
perfect equilibrium. Let n = 2 and Ai = {αi, βi}, i = 1, 2. Preferences are
8I thank an associate editor for making this point.
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lexicographic for both players. Let payoffs be given by Table 2.
1\2 α2 β2
α1 0, 1 −1,−1
β1 0,−1 0, 1
Table 2: Payoff Function for the Example
The following strategy f is such that in every stage players play a Nash
equilibrium of the stage game, but which is not a semi-perfect equilibrium of
the supergame: for all i = 1, 2, let Si = {s0, s1}, Ti(s0, a) = s1, Ti(s1, a) = s0
for all a ∈ A, Bi(s0) = αi and Bi(s1) = βi. This strategy is clearly finitely
complex, symmetric and globally stable. However, f is not semi-perfect:
player 1 has an incentive to deviate to
(
(S˜1, s˜
0
1), T˜1, B˜1
)
with S˜1 = {s˜} and
B˜1(s˜) = β1.
This example depends crucially on the fact that u1(β1, α2) = u1(β1, β2).
However, if we rule out such cases, we can completely characterize the set
of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibria. For-
mally, let, for all sets of players N and actions A, G(N,A) = {u = (ui)i∈N :
ui(a) 6= ui(a¯) for all a, a¯ ∈ A such that a 6= a¯} be the set of payoff functions
that assign different payoffs to different actions. Clearly, if A is finite, then
payoffs in G(N,A) ⊆ Rn|A| are generic.
The interest in payoff functions belonging to G(N,A) depends on the
following characterization.
Theorem 4 Let u ∈ G(N,A). Then, f is a finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium if and only if, comp(fi) = 1 for all
i ∈ N and B(s0) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. The if part is obvious, while the only if part follows from Lemma
2 and with Theorem 1. These two results imply that if f is a finitely com-
plex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium, then ui(B(s)) =
ui(B(s
0)) for all s ∈ S(f) and all i ∈ N and that B(s0) is a Nash equilib-
rium of G. Since, u ∈ G(N,A), then Si can have only one element. Thus,
comp(fi) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
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A.2 Variations
In this appendix, we study whether our results are robust to alternative
definitions of stability and minimal complexity.
We can weaken the notion of global stability by requiring that the initial
state should not have an effect on the long-run payoff level, without requir-
ing that this payoff level be equal to the equilibrium level. The following
definition formalizes this idea.9
Definition 4 Let f ∈ Σ. Then f is weakly globally stable if for all i ∈ N ,
and s, s¯ ∈ S,
lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s) = lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s¯). (13)
We can also change the notion of stability by explicitly considering the
complexity of the strategy. This is reasonable, since the idea of global sta-
bility is that players will eventually be virtually no worse off if some player
deviates and players’ preferences depend both on the payoff they receive and
the complexity of their strategies.10
Definition 5 Let f ∈ Σ and let (u¯i)i∈N = (U i(f))i∈N . Then f is º −globally
stable if for all i ∈ N and all s = (si)i∈N ∈ S,
lim
k→∞
(U ik(f |s), compk(fi|si)) = (u¯i, comp(fi)), (14)
where compk(fi|si) = comp(fi|sk) for all k ∈ N and {sk}k = s(fi|si).
Clearly, we can define the notion ofº −weak global stability by appropriately
combining the above definitions.
The notion of semi-perfection can also be weakened in a way suggested
by Abreu and Rubinstein (1988).
Definition 6 (Abreu and Rubinstein (1988)) A strategy vector f ∈ F
is a º −Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N , and f¯i ∈ Fi,
(U i(f), comp(fi)) ºi (U i(f¯i, f−i), comp(f¯i)). (15)
9The definition of weak global stability was suggested to me by Narayana Kocherlakota.
10This argument and the following definition was suggested to me by an anonymous
referee.
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One can also define a subgame perfect equilibrium for all supergames in
which preferences depend on both payoffs and complexity.
Definition 7 A strategy vector f ∈ F is a º −subgame perfect equilib-
rium if for all i ∈ N , s ∈ S and f¯i ∈ Fi with initial state s¯0i ,
(U i(f |s), comp(fi|s)) ºi (U i((f¯i, f−i)|(s¯0i , s−i)), comp(f¯i)). (16)
It is clear that if f is a º −subgame perfect equilibrium, then f is a
º −Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if f is a finitely complex, symmetric and
semi-perfect equilibrium, then f is also a º −subgame perfect equilibrium.
This follows from (the proof of) Lemma 1, which implies that comp(fi|si) =
comp(fi) for all si ∈ Si and i ∈ N .
The next result says that weak global stability is all we need for our
results.
Theorem 5 1. If a strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a finitely complex, sym-
metric, weakly globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium, then B(s) is a
Nash equilibrium of G, for all s ∈ S(f).
2. A payoff vector u = (ui)i∈N is a finitely complex, symmetric, weakly
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoff in the repeated game if
and only if u is a Nash equilibrium payoff in the stage game.
3. A strategy f is a Pareto optimal, finitely complex, symmetric, weakly
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium if and only if comp(fi) = 1 for
all i ∈ N and B(s0) is a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. In order to prove Theorem 5, it is enough to show that Lemma
2 still holds. This is clear: if we define u¯i = limk→∞ U ik(f |s), s ∈ S, then the
same proof can be used.
Note that º −global stability is stronger than global stability and that
º −weak global stability is stronger than weak global stability. Hence, it
follows from Theorem 5 that the conclusion of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 still hold
if we replace global stability with either weak global stability, º −global
stability or º −weak global stability.
However, our results are sensitive to the notion of equilibrium used. If
we use º −Nash equilibrium, then all our results may fail, as the following
example below shows.
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1\2 C D M
C 6, 6 0, 7 0, 0
D 7, 0 1, 53/3 0, 0
M 0, 0 0, 0 9,−1
Table 3: Payoff Function for the Example
Let n = 2 and Ai = {C,D,M}, i = 1, 2. Preferences are lexicographic
for both players, i.e., º=ºL. Let δ = 6/10, and stage game payoffs be given
by Table 3.
Consider the following strategy f : for all players i = 1, 2, the state space
is Si = {M,D,C}, and s0i =M ; the transition function is defined by
Ti(M,a) =
{
D if a = (M,M),
M otherwise,
(17)
Ti(D, a) =
{
C if a = (D,D),
D otherwise,
(18)
and
Ti(C, a) =

C if a = (C,C),
M if a = (C,D),
D otherwise;
(19)
the behavior function is Bi(M) = M , Bi(D) = D and Bi(C) = C. This
strategy is obviously symmetric and has finite complexity. It is also globally
stable, since U i(f) = 9(1− δ) + (1− δ)δ + 6δ2 = 6 and limk→∞ U ik(f |s) = 6
for all s ∈ S. It is easy to show that Ui(f) > Ui(f¯i, f−i) for all i ∈ N , and
f¯i ∈ Σi. Hence, it follows that f is a º −Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game.
However, we have that B(C) = (C,C) is not a Nash equilibrium of
the stage game; hence the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails. The set of Nash
equilibria payoffs in the stage game is N(G) = {(1, 1)}, but one sees that
U1(f) = U2(f) = 6. Thus, the conclusion of Theorem 2 fails. Finally, the
last equality also shows that the strategy that consists of playing the Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium (D,D) of the stage game forever is not Pareto
optimal in the repeated game.
Note also that f is º −globally stable since fi|M = fi|C = fi|D = fi and
so compk(fi|si) = comp(fi) for all k ∈ N. Thus, the conclusions of Theorems
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1, 2, and 3 may fail when semi-perfection is weakened to º −Nash, even if
we strengthen global stability to º −global stability.
Finally, we consider the case where the equilibrium concept isº −subgame
perfect equilibrium. For this equilibrium concept, all the results hold if we
restrict attention to cycle states. Furthermore, Theorems 2 and 3 still hold
with global stability.
For a given symmetric, and finitely complex strategy f let Sc(f) be
the set of cycle states. This set is defined as follows: a symmetric, fi-
nite automaton induces a sequence of states {sk}∞k=1 ⊆ D, where s1 = s0,
and sk = T (sk−1, B(sk−1)) in a way that t2 = min{m ∈ N : sm+1 =
sn for some n ≤ m} exists. Then Sc(f) = {st1 , . . . , st2}, where t1 ≤ t2 is
such that st1 = st2+1.
Lemma 3 If f is a finitely complex, symmetric, and º −subgame perfect,
then T (s, a) belongs to Sc(f) for all s ∈ Sc(f), and a ∈ A.
Proof. Let s ∈ Sc(f), and f be a finitely complex, symmetric, and º
−subgame perfect equilibrium. Let s¯ ∈ T (s, A) = {s˜ ∈ S : there exists a ∈
A such that s˜ = T (s, a)}.
Arguing as in Lemma 1, we can show that for all i ∈ N , if s¯i can be
reached from s, then s¯ can be reached from s.
Thus, if s¯ 6∈ Sc(f), then s¯ cannot be reached from s. Therefore, there
is a player i ∈ N such that s¯i cannot be reached from s. Thus, player i
would deviate from fi|si: he could remove the state s¯i, thereby reducing the
complexity of fi|si and still obtain the same payoff. But this contradicts the
fact that f is º − subgame perfect, and so, we conclude that s¯ ∈ Sc(f).
Theorem 6 If a strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a finitely complex, symmetric,
weakly globally stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium then B(s) is a Nash
equilibrium of G, for all s ∈ Sc(f). Furthermore, ui(s) = ui(s¯) for all i ∈ N
and s, s¯ ∈ Sc(f).
Proof. Assume that there exists s ∈ Sc(f) = S(f |s) that is not a Nash
equilibrium of G. Let i ∈ N , and a∗i be such that ui(a∗i , B−i(s)) > ui(B(s)).
Since T (s, (a∗i , B−i(s))) ∈ Sc(f) by Lemma 3, and since, as one easily sees,
the conclusion of Lemma 2 still holds for all s˜ ∈ Sc(f) = S(f |s), we can use
the proof of Theorem 1 to show that f is not º −subgame perfect.
As a consequence, we obtain the following result, stating that the con-
clusions of Theorems 2 and 3 hold if we replace semi-perfection with º
−subgame perfection.
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Theorem 7 1. A payoff vector u = (ui)i∈N is a finitely complex, sym-
metric, globally stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium payoff in the
repeated game if and only if u is a Nash equilibrium payoff in the stage
game.
2. A strategy f is a Pareto optimal, finitely complex, symmetric, globally
stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if comp(fi) = 1 for
all i ∈ N and B(s0) is a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. Abusing notation, let E(G) denote the set of finitely complex,
symmetric, globally stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in the
repeated game.
Let f ∈ F be a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, º −subgame
perfect equilibrium and s ∈ Sc(f). Then, limk→∞ U ik(f |s0) = ui(s) ∈ N(G)
by Theorem 6. Since f is globally stable, then U i(f) = ui(s) and so E(G) ⊆
N(G).
The remainder of the proof follows the same arguments used in the proofs
of Theorems 2 and 3.
Furthermore, if we strengthen global stability to º −global stability,
then the conclusions of Theorems 1, 2, and 3 still hold when semi-perfection
is replaced by º −subgame perfection.
Theorem 8 1. If a strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a finitely complex, sym-
metric, º −globally stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium, then B(s)
is a Nash equilibrium of G, for all s ∈ S(f).
2. A payoff vector u = (ui)i∈N is a finitely complex, symmetric, º −globally
stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium payoff in the repeated game if
and only if u is a Nash equilibrium payoff in the stage game.
3. A strategy f is a Pareto optimal, finitely complex, symmetric, º −globally
stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if comp(fi) = 1 for
all i ∈ N and B(s0) is a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. By Theorems 6, 9, and 10, it is enough to show that S(f) = Sc(f).
Let s ∈ Sc(f). Then, comp(fi|si) = |Sc(f)| by Lemma 3. Thus, since
limk→∞ compk(fi|s0i ) = comp(fi|si), and since f is º −globally stable, it
follows that comp(fi) = |Sc(f)|. Since Sc(f) ⊆ S(f), it follows that S(f) =
Sc(f).
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In contrast to Theorems 7 and 8, we find that the conclusions of Theorems
1, 2, and 3 may fail if we weaken the notion of stability from º −global
stability to weak global stability. However, they still hold if we restrict
ourselves to the cycle state, as Theorems 9 and 10 below show.
Let Ec(G) be the cycle payoff vectors supported by finitely complex, sym-
metric, weakly globally stable, º −subgame perfect equilibria. These payoff
vectors can be thought of as the payoff players will obtain in the long run
(note that these payoffs are well defined by an analogous version of Lemma
2.) As a consequence of Theorem 6 we have that Ec(G) = N(G).
Theorem 9 A payoff vector u = (ui)i∈N is a cycle payoff vector supported
by a finitely complex, symmetric, weakly globally stable, º −subgame perfect
equilibrium payoff in the repeated game if and only if u is a Nash equilibrium
payoff in the stage game.
Finally, in order to obtain an analog to Theorem 3, we define the following
notion of long-run Pareto optimality: an equilibrium f ∈ F is Pareto optimal
in the long run if it is not Pareto dominated in the long run by any other
equilibrium. An equilibrium f ∈ F Pareto dominates an equilibrium g in the
long run if for all s ∈ Sc(f),
(Ui(f |s), comp(fi|si)) º (Ui(g|s), comp(gi|si)), (20)
for all i ∈ N , and
(Uj(f |s), comp(fj|sj)) Â (Uj(g|s), comp(gj|sj)), (21)
for at least one j ∈ N . We then obtain
Theorem 10 A strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a Pareto optimal, finitely com-
plex, symmetric, weakly globally stable, º − subgame perfect equilibrium if
and only if comp(fi|si) = 1 for all i ∈ N and B(s0) is a Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium of G.
We can give an example that shows that we cannot extend the conclusions
of Theorems 6, 9, and 10 to all states if we use either weak global stability
or º −weak global stability. The example is like the previous one, except
that u1(M,M) = 3 = u2(M,M). Let n = 2 and Ai = {C,D,M}, i = 1, 2.
Preferences are lexicographic for both players. Let δ = 6/10, and stage game
payoffs be given by Table 4.
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1\2 C D M
C 6, 6 0, 7 0, 0
D 7, 0 1, 1 0, 0
M 0, 0 0, 0 3, 3
Table 4: Payoff Function for the Example
Consider the following strategy f : for all players i = 1, 2, the state space
is Si = {s0, s1, s2}; the transition function is
Ti(s
0, a) =
{
s1 if a = (C,C),
s2 otherwise,
(22)
Ti(s
1, a) = s2, and Ti(s
2, a) = s2 for all a ∈ A; the behavior function is
Bi(s
0) = C, Bi(s
1) = M and Bi(s
2) = D. This strategy is obviously
symmetric and has finite complexity. Is is weakly globally stable since
limk→∞ U ik(f |s) = 1 for all s ∈ S. It is easy to show that Ui(f |sl) >
Ui(f¯i, f−i|(s¯0i , sl−i) for all i ∈ N , sl = s0, s1, s2, and f¯i ∈ Σi with initial
state s¯0i . Hence, it follows that f is a º −subgame perfect equilibrium of the
repeated game.
However, we have that B(s0) = (C,C) is not a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game; hence the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails. The set of Nash equi-
librium payoffs in the stage game is N(G) = {(1, 1), (3, 3)}, but one sees
that U1(f) = U2(f) = 6(1 − δ) + 3δ(1 − δ) + δ2 > 3. Thus, the conclusion
of Theorem 2 fails. Finally, the last inequality also shows that the strategy
that consists of playing the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium (M,M) of the
stage game forever is not Pareto optimal in the repeated game.
Note also that f is º −weakly globally stable since limk→∞ U ik(f |s) =
ui(D,D) for all s ∈ S and limk→∞ compk(fi|si) = comp(fi|D) = 1 for all
si ∈ Si (since fi|D = (({D}, D), Ti|{D}×A, Bi|{D})). Thus, we cannot extend
the conclusions of Theorems 6, 9, and 10 to all states even if we strengthen
weak global stability to º − weak global stability.
Finally, we show that the conclusion of Theorem 1 does not hold if we
use º −subgame perfection together with global stability. Again, let n = 2,
δ = 6/10 and Ai = {C,D,M}, i = 1, 2. Preferences are again lexicographic
for both players. The stage game payoffs are changed and are given by Table
5.
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1\2 C D M
C 6, 6 0, 7 −8,−8
D 7, 0 1, 1 −8,−8
M −8,−8 −8,−8 −22/3,−22/3
Table 5: Payoff Function for the Example
Then, f , as defined in the previous example, is globally stable since
U i(f) = 6(1 − δ) − 22
3
(1 − δ)δ + (1 − δ)δ2 = 1. Since B(C) = (C,C) is
not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails.
The following table summarizes the results obtained for º −subgame
perfection.
Theorem 1 Theorem 2 Theorem 3
global stability C Y Y
weak global stability C C C
º −global stability Y Y Y
º −weak global stability C C C
Table 6: Results for º −subgame perfection
The symbol Y means that the conclusion of the corresponding Theorem holds. The symbol
C means that the conclusion of the corresponding Theorem holds only for cycle states.
Another variation that can be made is in the definition of complexity of
a strategy. Banks and Sundaram (1990), in the same framework as ours but
with only two players, consider a measure of complexity that takes into ac-
count not only the number of states of the smallest automaton implementing
it, but also the number of transitions emanating from each state. Using this
complexity measure, they show that assuming finite complexity is enough to
obtain the conclusion of Theorem 1. However, analogues of Theorem 2 and
3 are, in general, false.
As an example, consider the battle of the sexes game (see Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, page 19)) in which only pure actions are allowed, and
in which players have lexicographic preferences in its supergame. Then,
alternating between the two Nash equilibria of the stage game is a Pareto
optimal equilibrium in the sense of Banks and Sundaram (1990), and the
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resulting supergame payoff does not equal the payoff of any stage game Nash
equilibria.
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